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Abstract Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and Real Estate Operating
Companies (REOCs) seem to have different systematic risk
levels even though both invest almost exclusively in real estate-
related assets. The ﬁndings indicate that business risk is
negatively related to systematic risk, as measured by beta, for
REITs, while betas are positively related to agency costs for
REOCs. The two groups’ betas also show differing sensitivity to
real estate property type and regional location. REITs’systematic
risk is also sensitive to ﬁnancial leverage and ﬁnancing form.
Introduction
The most universally accepted investment advice is: diversify. Further advice holds
that a diversiﬁed investment portfolio should include real estate. Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs) are a proven way to obtain such diversiﬁcation for the
average investor. Chandrashekaran (1999) shows REITs decrease a portfolio’s
return variance and De Wit (1997) touts the unique diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of real
estate in the United States. The numerical growth of an alternative real estate
investment vehicle, Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs), raises the issue
of whether REOCs may provide a superior diversiﬁcation alternative to REITs.
Given that both forms exist to invest in real estate, any reason for investor
preference should lie in regulated differences. While many would identify taxes
as the most important difference, the ability to pursue growth with internally
generated funds is arguably of greater importance.
Looking at the two ﬁrm types more closely, there would seem to be little reason
for a preference based on business risk. Investors might prefer REOCs based on
their greater investment in hotel/motel assets, but if REOCs and REITs are
compared with similar investments, the two form’s systematic risk from
underlying business risk should also be similar. In that case, tax treatment and
permissible activities are two likely determinants of the preferable structure as
Damodaron, John and Liu (1997) hold. However, REOCs’ ability to use internally
generated cash ﬂows seems to be a more important factor as it allows REOCs
greater growth probability. In fact, Chan, Erickson and Wang (2003) state that the
REIT form is a disadvantage for any ﬁrm wanting to adopt a high-growth strategy.238  Delcoure and Dickens
The basic requirements to be a REIT as set forth by the IRS are: (1) they must
distribute 90% of income as dividends;1 (2) ownership must include 100
shareholders or more (with a prohibition against ﬁve or fewer shareholders owning
50% or more of the shares); (3) at least 75% of assets must be real estate oriented,
cash and/or government securities; (4) 75% or more of income must come from
rent, mortgages and gains from selling property (although the property should not
be owned principally for re-sale); and (5) they must hire independent real estate
professionals to execute certain management activities.
However, one fact about REITs is often misunderstood. It is true that, if a REIT
follows all requirements, the income used to pay dividends to its shareholders will
be exempt from corporate income taxes. Thus, its shareholders can avoid double
taxation on their earnings. However, it is not true that the REIT itself is exempt
from taxes. Any income not distributed as dividends by the REIT is subject to
corporate income taxes. Of course, the taxable amount should be relatively small:
10% of income at most and, given the fact that many REITs have enough
depreciation to allow distributions of 100% or more of net earnings, effectively
none.
The REOC format grew very slowly, but has become more viable in recent times.2
In the past, the tax advantages of the REIT outweighed any disadvantages.
However, the limitation on permissible activities seems to have driven recent
changes in the industry. Part of the reason seems to be associated with the passage
of the REIT Simpliﬁcation Act of 1997 and the REIT Modernization Act of 1999.
Between them, the two acts increased the permissible activities of REITs by
allowing Taxable REIT Subsidiaries (TRS). However, the second act prohibits a
TRS from operating or managing hotels or health care facilities. Thus, a REIT is
limited where a REOC is not, thus, the likely reason why so many hotel/motel
investment ﬁrms have the REOC form.
In general, REOCs face fewer restrictions than REITs. REOCs do not have to pay
any speciﬁc level of income as dividends (and most pay none), there is no
minimum restriction on the number of owners nor limits on ownership
concentration, the company can invest in any assets of its choosing, income may
be derived from any investment combination and speciﬁc tasks are not required
to be conducted by outside management. These factors lead to three potentially
important differences between REOCs and REITs. First, REOC shareholders’
dividends face double taxation as REOCs’ taxation is the same as a standard
corporation’s. Second, REOCs have greater investment opportunity sets, which
they can fund with internally generated funds without penalty (i.e., forfeiting tax
advantages). Third, REOCs do not need to hire outside management.
However, we do not believe the difference in taxes is truly material to the
individual investor. First, the REITs investigated in this study paid over $2 million
per year in taxes on average. This means that almost all of these REITs will be
paying taxes at the highest marginal rates of 34%–39%—just like REOCs.
Second, while REIT shareholders can avoid double taxation, REOC investors canREIT and REOC Systematic Risk Sensitivity  239
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do the same if REOCs retain earnings; an idea in keeping with Miller and Scholes
(1978) who hold that investors should equate the after-tax returns from the
disparate dividend policies.3
The other two potential factors, growth and outside management are important.
REOCs’ ability to retain earnings allows greater growth opportunities without
added external funding. Since growth is generally positively related to shareholder
returns, investors should prefer REOCs based on this factor.
The impact of outside management requirements is not as clear. REITs and, at
times, REOCs hire outside management. If outside management serves as a
monitor of inside management, the monitoring could decrease principal–agent
problems. However, it seems just as likely that the existence of outside
management adds multiple layers of potential principal–agent problems as
shareholders would have to worry about aligning internal and external
management’s interests with the shareholders’. As such, self-managed ﬁrms
should have a lower agency cost potential. The latter position has support from
studies (e.g., Cannon and Vogt, 1995) that ﬁnd self-managed REITs’ performance
superior. The two views together lead to no clear-cut advantage for investors in
regards to the REOC or REIT form based on REOC’s ability to forego outside
management.
The two factors, retaining earnings for growth and outside management, also
overlap. REITs, with their required dividend payouts, would seem to have little
need to hire outside management for monitoring purposes. That expectation seems
correct given that 66% of the REITs in the ﬁnal sample choose self-management.4
The implications from the dividend and outside management issues also lead to
differing conclusions concerning the use of leverage. REITs retain few earnings,
leading to the likely need for external ﬁnancing to fund growth. While new debt
should be less expensive than new equity, Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1997) report
REITs raised roughly twice as much in equity than debt over 1991–1996. Perhaps
REITs need to raise added equity to replace the funds paid out as dividends, but
they can not take full advantage of the tax shield for interest expense.
The same situation viewed differently means REOCs’lower dividend payout leads
to the need for greater monitoring. One possible way REOCs could align
management’s interests with shareholders’ is the use of leverage (Ross, 1977).5 If
true, REOCs should have greater leverage than REITs. Furthermore, the equation
developed in Hamada (1969) leads to the expectation that ﬁrms with greater
leverage will have more systematic risk.6 Thus, the leverage argument leads to the
expectation that REOCs will have greater systematic risk than REITs, all else
equal.7
In summary, the superior form, REIT or REOC, would be the one that provides
the best combination of growth opportunities and management interest alignment
with shareholders, with the minimum risk. REOCs seem to provide better growth
opportunities, but REITs would seem to have less principal/agent conﬂict240  Delcoure and Dickens
potential. The next section examines the literature related to these issues. The
sections that follow cover the data, methodology, results and conclusion.
 Literature Review
The REIT-related literature is extensive. Gyourko and Sinai (1999) provide a good
introduction to REITs with their thorough discussion of REITs’tax structure along
with the retained earnings implications. The authors ﬁnd that the REIT structure
is valuable, but estimate only 2%–5% of REITs’ market capitalization comes from
their organizational structure.
Damodaron, John and Liu (1997) also consider the implications of organizational
form for real estate investment in regards to changes from REITs, limited
partnerships, trusts and corporations into another’s form. They report that troubled
ﬁrms always move to more ﬂexible organizational forms and show some
performance improvements. Changing from REIT to REOC form would be such
a move. Healthy ﬁrms generally move to more restrictive organizational forms
and exhibit greater proﬁtability and dividend payouts, with lower free cash ﬂows.
While numerous studies consider the explanation of REIT returns (e.g., Chan,
Hendershott and Sanders, 1990; Allen, Madura and Springer, 2000; and Conover,
Friday and Howton, 2000), the importance of REIT systematic risk is open to
question. Some studies, for example Chen, Hsieh, Vines and Chiou (1998), do
not ﬁnd systematic risk to be a signiﬁcant variable in explaining REIT returns
when including ﬁrm size and market-to-book ratio. Others (e.g., Redman and
Manakyan, 1995; and Mooradian and Yang, 2001) show the need to control any
investigation using systematic risk for geographic location and property types.
However, several studies (Patel and Olsen, 1984; Khoo, Hartzell and Hoesli, 1993;
and Ambrose and Linneman, 2000) do speciﬁcally investigate the components of
REITs’ systematic risk. Patel and Olsen examine REIT systematic risk during
1976–1978 as a function of ﬁnancial leverage, business risk, advisor fee
variability, property owned as a percentage of total assets and marketability of
REIT shares. They ﬁnd ﬁnancial leverage, business risk and advisor fee variability
to be positively related to systematic risk. Khoo, Hartzell and Hoesli study the
decrease in REIT systematic risk between 1970 and 1989. They report the lower
risk over time to be related to increased information availability (proxied by the
number of analysts tracking the REITs). They conclude that REIT systematic risk
varies over time. Similarly, Ambrose and Linneman ﬁnd REIT systematic risk
greater in 1995–1996 as compared to 1990–1994. Furthermore, their results show
REIT systematic risk to be positively related to dividend payout, asset growth,
debt structure and ofﬁce building concentration.
Building on these works, a model is developed to examine the determinants of
REIT and REOC systematic risk. One basic question is whether the risk levels
will be signiﬁcantly different for the two groups. Another question is whether the
components of each group’s systematic risk are different.REIT and REOC Systematic Risk Sensitivity  241
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 Data and Model Specification
From the SNL Database (see Reeder, 2001), we identify all 168 (145 REITs, 23
REOCs) equity real estate ﬁrms trading on the New York or American Stock
Exchanges or in the NASDAQ system from January, 1997 through October, 2002.
The study begins with 1997 as seven of the twenty-three REOCs have their IPOs
after that date. One implication being that stock valuations were nearing their
peak. The next step is to create a more comparable sample considering the fact
that the investments of these REOCs are predominantly hotel/motel related. The
sample contains all fourteen publicly traded hotel/motel REITs. Fearing low
degrees-of-freedom problems, a random number generator was used to select
REITs randomly until the subsample contained REITs with 46% of their funds
invested in hotel/motel assets so as to match the REOC sample’s hotel/motel
property concentration. This REIT subsample contains thirty-two ﬁrms. Therefore,
the sample has thirty-two REITs and twenty-three REOCs, but with approximately
the same hotel/motel investment exposure.
Annual data was collected for total assets (TA), debt variables [long-term (LTD),
short-term (STD), variable rate (VRD) and convertible (CD)], average gross
properties (AGP), funds from operations (FFO), general and administrative
expenses (GA), net operating income (NOI) and the number of common shares
outstanding (CSO) from the SNL Database. Annual average trading volume and
systematic risk information was extracted from the Commodity Systems Inc. (CSI)
and Compustat databases.
The ‘‘beta’’ measurement from Compustat is used as the systematic risk
measurement. Compustat calculates betas over a ﬁve-year period using month-end
closing prices for the company’s stock and Standard & Poor’s 500 Index Price
for the market portfolio proxy. If price information is missing, Compustat will
furnish a beta using as few as twenty-four months’ data.
The investigation of the determinants of real estate investment companies’
systematic risk sensitivity begins with deﬁnitions of the following variables
suggested by the literature:
1. Financing. Various ratios are used to examine the impact of debt ﬁnancing
on REIT and REOC systematic risk. In general, greater debt usage should
be positively related to systematic risk in keeping with Hamada (1969).
Either the ratio of long-term debt to total assets or short-term debt to
assets given the wide array of ﬁnancing packages used by these real estate
ﬁrms is employed.
2. Variable Rate Financing. The ratio of variable rate debt to total debt. This
ratio is used as a proxy for the ﬁrm’s sensitivity to changes in borrowing
cost.
3. Business Risk. The ratio of funds from operations to total assets (FFO/
TA) is used as the measure of business risk. FFO is before interest and242  Delcoure and Dickens
Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics
REIT REOC
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Short-term Financing, % 4.976 30.390 10.044 49.446
Long-term Financing, % 68.492 51.166 46.369 77.987
Variable Financing, % 21.231 36.319 11.431 74.960
Marketability 9.734 1.679 10.414 2.780
Agency Cost 0.158 2.358 2.845 22.669
Business Risk 0.109 0.199 0.074 0.072
Beta 0.313 0.249 0.492 0.595
Note: Short-term ﬁnancing is the ratio of short-term debt to total assets, long-term ﬁnancing is the
ratio of long-term debt to total assets, variable-rate ﬁnancing is the ratio of variable rate debt to
total debt, marketability is the natural log of the ratio of average trading volume to common
shares outstanding, agency cost is the ratio of general and administrative expenses to net
operating income, business risk is the ratio of funds from operations to total assets and beta is a
measure of market risk.
taxes so that the implications of ﬁnancial leverage and taxes can be
separated. Funds from operations are scaled by total assets to account for
differences in company sizes. It is expected that a lower ratio (reﬂecting
more uncertainty as to cash ﬂows) will lead to a larger beta.
4. Marketability. The natural logarithm of the ratio of average trading
volume to common shares outstanding. It is expected that higher
marketability is related to lower systematic risk.
5. Agency. The ratio of ‘‘general and administrative expenses’’to net income.
The greater the ratio, the more likely that agency cost is a problem and
the higher the beta for the ﬁrm. REITs, with their higher dividend payouts
and lower growth expectations should have lower agency problems than
REOCs. Agency costs should be positively related to systematic risk.
Exhibit 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables separated by REOCs and
REITs. No means are signiﬁcantly different between the two groups, but simply
observation reveals a few interesting things. First, the average beta for REITs
(0.313) compared to REOCs (0.492) shows why REITs have been touted as a
good diversiﬁcation tool. Second, the samples are ‘‘matched’ to the same level of
hotel/motel investment, REITs no longer seem to have the higher risk and, in
fact, have the lower average beta; although there is no statistical difference. Also,
both REOCs and REITs rely on long-term debt (68.49% for REITs vs. 46.37%
for REOCs) with REITs using variable rate ﬁnancing at a higher rate than REOCs
(21.23% vs. 11.43%).REIT and REOC Systematic Risk Sensitivity  243
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Adj. R2 2.9% 2.3%
Note: Mean tests on market premium and term premium coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant. Coefﬁcients
are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
The REIT and REOC differences indicate that a two-factor model examining
returns sensitivity to the market index and interest rates may provide added insight.
This possibility is investigated using the following model:
(R  R)  (R  R)  (R  R), (1) fS P 5 0 0 fT - b o n d s f
where R is REOCs’ returns (REITs’ returns), Rf is the realized yield on thirty-day
U.S. Treasury Bills, RT-bonds is the realized yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury Bonds
and RSP500 is the rate of return on the S&P 500 Index.
The comparison in Exhibit 2 conﬁrms that REOCs and REITs have relatively low
sensitivity to stock market movements, but also shows a need to consider the
spread of the term structure of interest rates. The negative coefﬁcient on the term
premium means that REOC and REIT returns increase when the term premium
spread decreases. This result implies REIT and REOC values increase as the
relative yield on long-term bonds decreases, which would be consistent with the
ﬁrms’ being able to take advantage of reﬁnancing at lower rates during the test
period.
The means tests also show that REOCs have higher risk relative to the stock
market index and REITs show greater absolute risk to changing term structure
situations. Based on this evidence, if comparing like-property investments for
REITs and REOCs, the REITs seem to be the better portfolio diversiﬁcation tool.
The second step in the analysis is to investigate the systematic risk of REOCs and
REITs by estimating the following model:244  Delcoure and Dickens
Beta     * FinancingTerm   * VRfinancing ttt t
  * Marketability   * AgencyCost tt
  * BusinessRisk  , (2) tt
where Betat is the systematic risk in period t, FinancingTerm is the ratio of short-
term (long-term) debt to total debt in period t, VRﬁnancing is the ratio of variable
debt to total debt in period t, Marketability is the natural log of the ratio of trading
volume to the number of common shares outstanding in period t, Agency Cost is
the ratio of General and Administrative Expenses to Net Operating Income in
period t, Business Risk is the ratio of Funds From Operations to Total Assets in
period t and t is the error term. Exhibit 3 reports the correlation matrix for the
variables and does not raise undue multicollinearity concerns.
Redman and Manakyan (1995) ﬁnd real estate assets invested in health care
property provide higher risk-adjusted performance, so the following variable is
added to Equation (2):
6. Property Types. The ratio of investment in a speciﬁc property type to total
assets.
Variables for are also added for commercial, industrial, residential and
undeveloped properties based on descriptors set by the National Council of Real
Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF).
Beta     * FinancingTerm   * VRfinancing t t tt
  * Marketability   * AgencyCost tt
  * BusinessRisk   * CP  	 * Ind tt t
 
 * Resid   * Land  , (3) tt t
where CP is the percentage of assets invested in commercial property (deﬁned as
shopping centers, ofﬁce buildings and hotels/motels), Ind is the percentage of
assets invested in industrial properties (deﬁned as factories, warehouses and
industrial parks), Resid is the percentage of assets invested in residential properties
(deﬁned as single- and multi-family housing as well as manufactured houses),
Land is the percentage of assets invested in undeveloped land.
Redman and Manakyan (1995) also ﬁnd investment in Western U.S. properties
impact REIT risk-adjusted returns. To recognize the possible inﬂuence of regional



































































Financing Marketability Agency Cost Business Risk Beta
Panels A: REITs
Short-term Financing 1
Long-term Financing 0.202 1
Variable Financing 0.111 0.343 1
Marketability 0.268 0.095 0.052 1
Agency Cost 0.040 0.095 0.078 0.073 1
Business Risk 0.078 0.135 0.054 0.690 0.009 1
Beta 0.189 0.142 0.150 0.233 0.055 0.312 1
Panel B: REOCs
Short-term Financing 1
Long-term Financing 0.849 1
Variable Financing 0.390 0.342 1
Marketability 0.166 0.204 0.100 1
Agency Cost 0.064 0.118 0.024 0.211 1
Business Risk 0.042 0.016 0.099 0.288 0.417 1
Beta 0.012 0.038 0.068 0.159 0.330 0.234 1
Note: Short-term ﬁnancing is the ratio of short-term debt to total assets, long-term ﬁnancing is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, variable-rate
ﬁnancing is the ratio of variable rate debt to total debt, marketability is the natural log of the ratio of average trading volume to common shares
outstanding, agency cost is the ratio of general and administrative expenses to net operating income, business risk is the ratio of funds from operations to
total assets, and beta is a measure of market risk.246  Delcoure and Dickens
7. Geographic Area. Variable to account for regional variations in economic
growth in the U.S. The NCREIF regional deﬁnitions are used.
Beta     * FinancingTerm   * VRfinancing ttt t
  * Marketability   * AgencyCost tt
  * BusinessRisk   * NE tt
 	 * ME  
 * WN   * EN   * SE tttt
 v * SW  
 * P   * F   * MO  , (4) tt t t t
where NE, ME, WN, EN, SE, SW, P and MO are the percentage of property
invested in the northeast, mideast, west north central, east north central, southeast,
southwest, paciﬁc and mountain regions of the U.S., F is the percentage of
property invested in foreign locations.
Equations (2), (3) and (4) are estimated separately for the REIT and REOC
subsamples.
 Results
Exhibit 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (2) with the Financing
variable short-term debt to total assets in Panel A and long-term debt to total
assets in Panel B.8 Empirical results show that REITs’ business risk is negatively
related to beta and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Thus, a lower ratio (reﬂecting more
uncertainty as to cash ﬂows) leads to a larger beta. Agency Cost is found to be
positively related to REOCs’ beta (Panel B). Thus, REOCs, which have neither
the outside management nor the dividend payout requirements of REITs, exhibit
a greater relationship between agency costs and systematic risk.
The ﬁndings from Exhibit 4 reveal that the debt ﬁnancing variables have no impact
on REOC betas. Based on the discussion that most REITs retain no earnings and
that the ﬁndings indicate a higher percentage of debt for REITs, the REITs’market
performance should be more sensitive to their ﬁnancing choice than REOCs.
Exhibit 4 shows REITs’reliance on short-term ﬁnancing decreases their systematic
risk (Model 1, Panel A’s short-term ﬁnancing coefﬁcient is 0.149 and signiﬁcant
at the 10% level), where REITs’ choice to ﬁnance operations through long-term
debt increases their market risk (Model 2, Panel A’s long-term ﬁnancing coefﬁcient
is 0.118 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level).
In Exhibit 4, Model 2, Panel A also shows REITs’ variable-rate ﬁnancing ratio is
negatively related to systematic risk (variable-rate ﬁnancing coefﬁcient is 0.205





























































Exhibit 4  Determinants of Systematic Risk in Real Estate Companies
Intercept Financing VR Financing Marketability Agency Cost Business Risk Adj. R2 (%) CNa A.I.C.b B.I.C.c
Panel A: Model 2
REITs 10.240 0.149*** 0.081 0.942 0.526 77.755* 11.64 3.065 9.735 7.002
(0.624) (0.100) (0.286) (0.621) (0.591) (0.004)
REOCs 18.330 0.046 0.036 0.587 0.470* 51.233 8.7 2.760 10.090 7.390
(0.239) (0.545) (0.470) (0.661) (0.007) (0.341)
Panel B: Model 2A
REITs 13.442 0.118** 0.205* 0.622 0.707 76.611* 13.28 4.256 9.716 6.983
(0.518) (0.014) (0.002) (0.741) (0.468) (0.004)
REOCs 23.102 0.054 0.043 0.730 0.484* 47.468 9.46 2.862 10.081 7.385
(0.156) (0.260) (0.377) (0.586) (0.005) (0.375)
Note:
Model 2: Betat  t  t * FinancingTerm  t * VRﬁnancing  t * Marketability  t * AgencyCost  t * BusinessRisk  t, where Betat is the
systematic risk of real estate companies in period t, Financing is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt in period t, VRﬁnancing is the ratio of variable
debt to total debt in period t, Marketability is the natural log of (trading volume/number of common shares outstanding) in period t, Agency Cost is the
ratio of General and Administrative Expenses to Net Operating Income in period t, Business Risk is the ratio of Funds from Operations to Total Assets in
period t and t is an error term.
Model 2a: Betat  t  t * FinancingTerm  t * VRﬁnancing  t * Marketability  t * AgencyCost  t * BusinessRisk  t, where the variables are
as described above except Financing, which is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt in period t.
aCN is the conditional number measuring multicollinearity.
bA.I.C. is the Akaike Information Criteria.
cB.I.C. is the Schwartz measure of the model’s goodness of ﬁt as we add model variables.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.































Risk Commercial Industrial Residential Land Adj. R2 (%) CNa A.I.C.b B.I.C.c
Panel A: Model 3
REITs 23.928 0.153* 0.101 1.373 0.408 70.642*** 0.043 0.128** 0.065 0.011 14.41 24.047 9.724 7.061
(0.318) (0.089) (0.188) (0.467) (0.681) (0.009) (0.845) (0.012) (0.512) (0.830)
REOCs 17.307 0.001 0.001 1.024 0.441** 72.750 0.098 0.151 0.160* 0.172** 13.46 14.097 10.068 7.466
(0.507) (0.989) (0.968) (0.568) (0.012) (0.186) (0.234) (0.342) (0.076) (0.014)









Risk Commercial Industrial Residential Land Adj. R2 (%) CNa A.I.C.b B.I.C.c
REITs 27.163 0.119** 0.229*** 1.002 0.532 70.364*** 0.033 0.123** 0.055 0.029 15.98 25.349 9.706 7.042
(0.254) (0.013) (0.001) (0.590) (0.590) (0.009) (0.877) (0.015) (0.578) (0.562)
REOCs 8.671 0.057 0.022 0.583 0.455*** 61.966 0.103 0.136 0.151* 0.172** 14.65 14.052 10.054 7.452
(0.745) (0.225) (0.653) (0.745) (0.009) (0.256) (0.211) (0.386) (0.092) (0.012)
Notes:
Model 3: Betat  t  t * FinancingTerm  t * VRﬁnancing  t * Marketability  t * AgencyCost  t * BusinessRisk  t * CP  	t * Ind  
t *
Resid  t * Land  t, where Betat is the systematic risk of real estate companies in period t, Financing is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt in
period t, VRﬁnancing is the ratio of variable debt to total debt in period t, Marketability is the natural log of (trading volume/number of common shares
outstanding) in period t, Agency Cost is the ratio of General and Administrative Expenses to Net Operating Income in period t, Business Risk is the ratio of
Funds From Operations to Total Assets in period t, CP is the percentage of assets invested in commercial property (shopping center, ofﬁce buildings, hotels/
motels), IND is the percentage of assets invested in industrial property (factories, warehouses, industrial parks), RESID is the percentage of assets invested in
residential real estate (single- and multi-family housing and manufactured homes), Land is the percentage of assets invested in land and t is an error term.
Model 3a: Betat  t  t * FinancingTerm  t * VRﬁnancing  t * Marketability  t * AgencyCost  t * BusinessRisk  t * CP  	t * Ind  
t *
Resid  t * Land  t, where the variables are deﬁned as above with Financing is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt in period.
aCN is the conditional number measuring multicollinearity.
bA.I.C. is the Akaike Information Criteria.
cB.I.C. is the Schwartz measure of the model’s goodness of ﬁt as we add model variables.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.





























































Exhibit 6  Property Geographic Location Impact on the Determinants of Systematic Risk of Real Estate Companies
REITs REOCs
Variable Coefﬁcient p-value Coefﬁcient p-value Coefﬁcient p-value Coefﬁcient p-value
Intercept 16.7760 0.456 18.483 0.411 10.721 0.620 11.253 0.605
Short-term ﬁnancing 0.195** 0.046 0.013 0.864
Long-term ﬁnancing 0.110** 0.033 0.097 0.856
Variable rate ﬁnancing 0.108 0.199 0.248*** 0.001 0.044 0.404 0.036 0.495
Marketability 1.454 0.463 1.106 0.574 0.676 0.696 0.634 0.713
Agency Cost 0.713 0.495 0.783 0.454 0.328* 0.085 0.325* 0.087
Business Risk 57.265** 0.040 59.738** 0.031 115.054* 0.056 112.588* 0.060
NE 0.003 0.967 0.020 0.748 0.035 0.773 0.040 0.740
ME 0.029 0.764 0.029 0.762 0.252** 0.019 0.253** 0.018
WN 0.055 0.405 0.055 0.407 0.315* 0.064 0.321** 0.060
EN 0.136* 0.066 0.107 0.138 0.058 0.788 0.062 0.775
SE 0.166** 0.022 0.139* 0.051 0.036 0.642 0.033 0.671
SW 0.109 0.278 0.090 0.369 0.468** 0.024 0.461** 0.026
P 0.009 0.897 0.012 0.866 0.155** 0.027 0.151** 0.034
F 0.104 0.868 0.013 0.839 0.063 0.413 0.053 0.527
MO 0.059 0.482 0.086 0.293 0.087 0.469 0.094 0.444






















Exhibit 6  (continued)
Property Geographic Location Impact on the Determinants of Systematic Risk of Real Estate Companies
REITs REOCs
Variable Coefﬁcient p-value Coefﬁcient p-value Coefﬁcient p-value Coefﬁcient p-value
F value 3.395 0.000 3.459 0.000 3.206 0.000 3.327 0.000
A.I.C 9.770 9.763 10.014 10.014
B.I.C. 7.194 7.188 7.530 7.530
CN 6.719 7.346 15.698
Notes:
Model 4: Betat  t  t * FinancingTerm  t * VRﬁnancing  t * Marketability  t * AgencyCost  t * BusinessRisk  t * NE  	t * ME  
t *
WN  t * EN  t *S E t *S W 
t * P  t * F  * MO  t, where Betat is the systematic risk of equity REIT in period t, Financing is the ratio t
of short-term debt (long-term debt) to total debt in period t, VRﬁnancing is the ratio of variable debt to total debt in period t, Marketability is the a natural
log of (trading volume/number of common shares outstanding) in period t, Agency Cost is the ratio of General and Administrative Expenses to Net
Operating Income in period t, Business Risk is the ratio of Funds From Operations to Total Assets in period t, NE is the percentage of assets invested in
property located in the northeast U.S., ME is the percentage assets invested in property located in the mideast U.S., WN is the percentage assets invested in
property located in the west north central U.S., EN is the percentage assets invested in property located in the east north central U.S., SE is the percentage
assets invested in property located in the southeast U.S., SW is the percentage assets invested in property located in the southwest U.S., P is the percentage
assets invested in property located in the paciﬁc U.S., F is the percentage assets invested in property located in foreign countries, MO is the percentage of
assets invested in property location in the mountain U.S. and t is an error term.
aCN is the conditional number measuring multicollinearity.
bA.I.C. is the Akaike Information Criteria.
cB.I.C. is the Schwartz measure of the model’s goodness of ﬁt as we add model variables.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.REIT and REOC Systematic Risk Sensitivity  251
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expectation that higher leverage leads to greater systematic risk. At the same time,
the estimated coefﬁcient of VRﬁnancing suggests that higher variable rate debt
leads to lesser systematic risk. Recall that Exhibit 1 shows 21.23% of REIT debt
is variable rate.
Empirical evidence in Exhibit 5 suggests that real estate ﬁrms’ market risk is
sensitive to the real estate investment type. REITs’ investing in industrial
properties exhibit a lower level of systematic risk (estimated coefﬁcient is 0.128
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in Model 3, Panel A and 0.123 in Model 4, Panel
A). The ﬁndings imply that REOCs’ investing in undeveloped land increases their
systematic risk exposure (estimated coefﬁcient is 0.172 and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level in both Model 3, Panel A and Model 4, Panel A), while housing investment
reduces REOCs’ average systematic risk (the estimated coefﬁcient is 0.160 and
signiﬁcant at the 10% level in Model 3, Panel A and 0.151 in Model 4, Panel
A). The improved adjusted R2 measures and the signiﬁcance of the various
property variables show the usefulness of adding them to Equation (2).
Exhibit 6 reports the results from estimating Equation (4). The ﬁndings indicate
a statistically signiﬁcant relation between properties’ geographical location and
real estate ﬁrms’ systematic risk. Property ownership in the southeastern U.S. adds
systematic risk for REITs while investing in the east north central region decreases
REITs’ risk.
Investing in the mid-east, west north central and paciﬁc regions shows a negative
relation to REOC systematic risk while investing in the southwest has a positive
relation. Thus, investors should carefully examine the geographical location of
REIT and REOC properties before making real estate investment choices.
The ﬁndings also indicate that relationships between business risk, agency cost
and systematic risk are robust. After controlling for the property locations, agency
cost is still positively related to REOC systematic risk, and business risk is
negatively related to REIT market risk. However, for the ﬁrst time, the uncertainty
of REOCs’ ability to generate cash ﬂows from operations adds to their systematic
risk exposure. Thus, greater uncertainty as to cash ﬂows leads to higher systematic
risk for REOCs as is does for REITs in keeping with expectations.
 Conclusion
Based on casual observation, REITs’ systematic risk appears to be consistently
greater than REOCs’, even though both investment company structures invest
almost exclusively in real estate. However, once a sample of REITs is created
with the same investment percentage in hotel/motel assets, REOCs seem to have
relatively greater systematic risk. Once the sample controls for a ﬁrm’s returns for
a term structure, REOCs’ systematic risk is signiﬁcantly greater than REITs’. To
examine the differences in REIT and REOC systematic risk further, systematic
risk is estimated as a function of ﬁnancing, marketability, agency cost, business
risk, and either property function or geographic location.252  Delcoure and Dickens
In every formulation, REIT systematic risk has a negative relationship to the ratio
of funds from operations to total assets. Thus, the lower the certainty of cash ﬂows
from normal operations, the greater the systematic risk. For REOCs, higher agency
costs as measured by the ratio of general and administrative expenses to net
operating income have a positive relationship to systematic risk in every
formulation.
Evidence is also found to corroborate the ﬁndings of Redman and Manakyan
(1995) as to the importance of controlling for property type and location. The
ﬁndings indicate that REITs with greater industrial property holdings have lower
systematic risk. In another formulation, REITs with greater investments in the
southeast have greater systematic risk. For REOCs, greater residential and
undeveloped land holdings show lower and higher systematic risk, respectively.
Also, investing in the mid-east, west north central and paciﬁc shows negative
relationships to systematic risk while investing in the southwest shows a positive
relationship.
Taken together, the results provide support for the following:
1. The potential for agency costs seems to be a greater worry for REOCs;
2. Business risk, as measured by funds from operations to total assets, is an
important factor for both REITs and REOCs, but of greater signiﬁcance
to REITs;
3. Controlling for the property type and location is important in comparing
these real estate property investment ﬁrms; and
4. The ﬁnancing method utilized is of more importance for REITs than
REOCs in explaining systematic risk. For REITs, greater short-term
ﬁnancing and variable-rate ﬁnancing are both negatively related to
systematic risk. These results support the idea of lesser interest rate risk
leading to lower systematic risk. Also, greater long-term debt has a
positive relationship to REIT systematic risk, as expected.
In summary, the ﬁndings show that REOCs have greater systematic risk than
REITs after controlling for term structure considerations. REITs and REOCs also
have similar, but different systematic risk traits. Taken together, REITs should
afford better diversiﬁcation possibilities in general, but investors should also
consider geographic and/or property use speciﬁcs.
 Endnotes
1 The distribution rate changed from 95% to 90% on January 1, 2001.
2 Hilton Hotels was the ﬁrst REOC in 1947. The next still actively traded REOC did not
have its IPO until 1970 and seven of the twenty-three REOCs in the sample have an IPO
date from 1997 or later.
3 If approved in its current form, the recent 2003 tax package will reduce REITs’ dividend
advantage further as REIT dividends would continue to be taxed at the 38.6% rate while
non-REIT dividends would be taxed at the 15% rate.REIT and REOC Systematic Risk Sensitivity  253
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4 Of the 145 REITs initially identiﬁed, 82.8% choose self-management.
5 Given that 87.0% of the REOCs in the sample choose self-management, outside managers
do not seem to provide a monitoring role for REOCs.
6 Note that the Hamada model builds on the Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) models.
In addition, Ehrhardt and Daves (2002) discuss problems related to these models when
considering ﬁrms with non-zero growth.
7 A further complicating factor is interest rate risk, which should be positively related to
systematic risk. However, Allen, Madura and Springer (2000) ﬁnd no relation between
interest rate risk and REIT stock returns.
8 Note that the conditional number does not indicate any multicollinearity problems for
any of the regressions nor do the Akaike index and the Swartz B.I.C. indicate signiﬁcant
problems for adjusted R
2s from adding variables to the models in Exhibits 4–6.
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